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A Dialogue on
Conglomerate Mergers*
AN INSIDER LOOKS AT CONGLOMERATES
By JA Es J. LING**
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I am most appreciative of Bill King's very kind introduction. Bill and I have
been acquainted for many years. It goes back to the time I
decided to expand our small electronics firm. It had become
obvious that, for the first time, we would have to go to the public
market place for financing and I came face to face with a very
strange document called a "registration statement."
It was necessary that I visit with Mr. King, who had recently
become the Texas Securities Commissioner, because he questioned
the proposed offering price as being fair. Bill certainly had his
problems when he inherited that office because, as most of you
will recall, Texas had a substantial number of insurance company scandals relating to market issues at that time.
When Ling Electronics filed its registration statement with
Bill's office, our relatively poor financial history of earnings, due
to research and development and start-up expenses, and an
equally difficult financial statement, caused Bill to view our
proposed offering price with a bit of skepticism. However, I think
Bill gave us some credit because he was aware of our comparatively
successful electrical contracting and engineering company which
just recently became publicly owned through a Texas intrastate
offering.
Our proposal was to issue to the public shares of stock at
$3.00 per share along with some convertible debentures, convertible, I think, at approximately $3.00.
This Dialogue is a reprint of speeches presented by the authors before the North

American Securities Administrators Conference at Bal Harbour-Miami, Florida,
on October 9, 1968.
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.
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I don't recall exactly how we arrived at the $3.00 figure. It was
a mutually agreed upon price between the company and the
underwriters and I must say I was a bit shocked when Bill's
office questioned if the price was fair. In any event, Bill and I
had a cup of coffee and tried to resolve the problem which, of
course, we did. However, I would like to tell you how we did it.
I volunteered to place all the shares I owned in escrow with
a Dallas bank before the company went public as well as to buy a
substantial number of shares out of the underwriting at the price
the public paid for the shares.
It was agreed that I could remove half of my shares from
escrow only after I had earned around $400,000 pre-tax and could
not get a final release on the balance of the shares until I had
earned at least $800,000 pre-tax.
Further, in the event of involuntary liquidation for any reason
whatsoever, until the public was paid off at the rate of at least
$3.00 a share, my shares would receive nothing.
I guess I was a bit naive for proposing such a ridiculous
escrow agreement when all that Bill wanted me to do was sell the
shares at $2.25 or $2.50 as opposed to my $3.00 per share price.
On reflection, I guess I had an extreme amount of confidence
in the future of my very small company. Incidentally, I would
have been much better off to have purchased shares at $2.25 a
share instead of paying $3.00. In any event, we felt that $3.00 per
share was the proper price. Of course, another thought occurs to
me: That Bill may have done me a real favor by questioning the
proposed offering price.
I think the measure of confidence that I demonstrated to Bill,
by offering to purchase these additional shares out of the market,
helped persuade him to approve the offering price. I might add
that I had to borrow a substantial amount of money from the
Dallas banks in order to purchase these additional shares.
In retrospect, now, if Bill had not questioned the offering
price ...

would I have purchased those shares? I am glad I did,

because as of this date, those shares are worth approximately
$5 million. (Bill, don't send me an invoice or statement for
services rendered.)
I have been invited to discuss the structure and the concept
of the LTV conglomerate which, of course, I am delighted to do.
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My presentation will cover the background of not only how we
became a conglomerate, but why we have become a conglomerate.
Hopefully, I can prove that LTV, as a conglomerate, (and I
will accept the fact that the term conglomerate applies to LTV)
is making a real contribution both financially and socially to the
economic and free enterprise system of this country.
Also, I would like to comment about LTV's interface with the
various regulatory agencies that cross our paths in the day-to-day
affairs of our business.
Let me start off by saying I have made a number of public
presentations where I have questioned certain practices of the
agencies as well as certain of the bureaucrats themselves. Before
you jump to the conclusion that I am against either the agencies
or the bureaucrats, let me assure you that I am not. I understand
the nature, the function and vital importance of the agencies. I
have great respect for the majority of the gentlemen involved in
the agencies.
Incidentally, it is my personal belief and desire that I will have
an opportunity to become a bureaucrat in later years so that I
might make a contribution to this country that has given me
such a fabulous opportunity. I think a few random comments are
in order regarding certain of the bureaucrats in the various
agencies.
To begin with, let me take the positive side. The civil servants
that I have had personal contact with, the many members of the
Department of Defense, as well as the men in uniform, have
impressed me as being dedicated people. In fact, I am sure
that I have contributed to the perennial people problem with the
various governmental agencies by recruiting many of these capable
people to work in industry.
I am keenly aware that many of the agencies, the SEC and
State Security Administrators, and Bill King's organization in
particular, are badly understaffed in view of the enormous workload generated over the past 10 years by industry's financing requirements.
With some exceptions, we have received absolutely fine treatment from the majority of the "blue sky" commissioners in all
the states as well as the Securities and Exchanges Corporate
Division.
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However, and I speak with a great deal of candor and I
believe that is the reason why I have been invited here today, I
would be sailing under false colors if I did not make the comment
that I do believe there have been some irresponsible individuals
in certain sections of the SEC as well as the Justice Department
-people who are a little bit too eager to develop irresponsible
charges and irresponsible lawsuits.
Again, you gentlemen must realize that 99.9% of the businessmen in this country have no appetite to challenge in any manner,
any of the agencies and particularly, the SEC. The odds are
weighted very heavily in favor of the agencies.
Let me share with you my personal experience. The most appalling thing in the world, the most humiliating thing in the
world, is to find yourself, without any kind of notice whatsoever,
in the public spotlight by being unjustly sued by the SEC. I
speak with great candor because I have had that experience.
As most of you are aware, the majority of the unsophisticated
public automatically judge a company guilty simply because the
American public has great respect for the agencies. You have
enormous power but also you have enormous responsibilities. And
I do believe that in the majority of the cases your power is used
discriminately and conservatively but there have been flagrant
abuses of that power simply because human judgment in the
agencies is certainly not infallible.
I have always felt that perhaps we, the businessmen and the
various agency officials, should get together in either an official or
an unofficial seminar from time to time and have a bit of
dialogue and exchange our points of view so that we might have
a better understanding of our mutual problems.
Jointly, perhaps as a result of this understanding, we might
persuade the congress or state legislatures to increase your budgets
so that you might add the necessary staff to service your good
customers. Essentially, I consider LTV a good customer of yours.
As an illustration, we estimated that we will pay the SEC approximately $375,000 in filing fees in the current year.
In the past few years we have filed nearly 100 registration
statements with the SEC and many of the states represented here
today. I am sure that we have overworked not only a very able
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and dedicated SEC representative in Washington but also many
of the persons here today or members of your staffs.
Because our companies are growing, we must compete for the
investment dollars and timing, as you well know, is all important.
I do not believe it unreasonable to say that since we are
perhaps one of the biggest customers of the SEC, we do expect
service.
I have suggested in the past, and I pass along to you here and
now, the feasibility of the SEC approving or appointing outside
boards of examiners who specialize in the fields of law and accounting as they relate to developing a registration statement or
prospectus. These boards would be drawn from legal or accounting fraternities and from members of the SEC, if they
decide to make a change, or perhaps members of the state
security administrators. These boards would, in effect, approve
95% of the content of the registration statements which would be
within the scope of their special expertise. They then would submit the registration statement, virtually completed, to the SEC
for approval.
I am convinced that a program such as this would expedite
registration statements and remove a big percentage of the workload from those already overburdened agencies.
Perhaps my idea of a public board of examiners would be applicable to only those companies who have been in business and
publicly owned and listed for a period of at least five years. I am
sure that more finite details could be developed along this
premise. I, in no way, propose that the SEC abdicate its ultimate
responsibility for the final approval of the registration statement.
We would, of course, as would any other registrant, have to pay
the additional cost incurred by our use of these outside examining
boards. However, we could demand of them and pay the necessary overtime that would be required when we wanted the
preliminary prospectus approved on an accelerated basis. Another
thought that certainly occurs to me and I am sure it would you
also, is that in order to expedite registration statements on a
timely basis in the agencies themselves, we in industry would be
quite willing to pay a higher filing fee to the SEC and to the
various states where we seek blue sky approval.
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The securities market being what it is, a delay could cost us
millions of dollars. We would much rather spend a fraction of
that amount by increasing the filing fee or pay a special fee in
order to expedite our approval.
Incidentally, just so you will know how I feel in comparing
bureaucrats with industry executives, the most overbearing, officious person in the world is the "execu-crat" of whom we have
our share of in industry. Perhaps I am one of them, although I try
not to be.
Now, let me discuss the origin or genesis of the company now
known as "Ling-Temco-Vought."
I started a small electrical contracting engineering firm on
January 1, 1947. My qualifications consisted of several years of
practical experience, correspondence courses in electrical engineering and technical training in a naval electrical school. I had some
practical application of my newly acquired skills and knowledge
in the Philippines during World War II and I guess I had a
severe case of entrepreneurial ambition.
My life savings were approximately $2,500 when I was discharged from the Navy in the early part of 1946. Prior to my entry
into service, I had done some long-range planning in order to
provide for my family when the inevitable and predictable time
came for me to join the service. I worked from 7:00 in the
morning until 4:00 in the afternoon for an electrical contracting
firm, then worked the night shift from 5:00 p.m. until 1.00 a.m. at
the Lockheed Modification Plant located in Dallas. The result of
nearly two years of this labor found me with $2,500 in savings
bonds and about 18 pounds lighter!
My first real experience with a regulatory agency happened in
Dallas when I attempted to secure a master electrician's and
electrical contractor's license at the age of 22. I was told that in
order to obtain this license it normally would take 12 years of
study, experience, and work. I insisted upon an examination because I felt I was qualified and of course the examination would
determine my exact deficiencies.
I did fail the examination the first time simply because of the
lack of some specialized technical knowledge. I went to work to
cure this shortcoming and six months later took the examination
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again. By passing I became the youngest person, at that time, ever
to pass the master electrician and electrical contractor examinations in the city of Dallas.
Equipped with what I considered a hunting license, I organized
my original company, Ling Electric Company. By 1953-54 I had
developed a reasonably successful contracting and engineering
business.
Essentially, I was semi-retired at the age of 30 in the 1953-54
period of time. I played golf five days a week and had enough
time to be elected president of one of the country clubs in Dallas.
I found out rather quickly that I was ill at ease in this semiretirement and became involved in business again. I felt that I
wanted to expand beyond electrical contracting, which is primarily a service business, and get into electrical or electronic product production.
On my travels to the West Coast I had seen the boom in
electronics. In order to accomplish my objectives I raised approximately $700,000 through a Texas intrastate offering. Subsequently, I purchased a product line from a company which was
essentially bankrupt for about $19,000, and also assumed some
rather substantial liabilities.. The main asset of the company was
a sophisticated but not quite proven electronic environmental
testing system, plus some very dedicated people.
We changed the name of the company to Ling Electronics and
proceeded to consume more capital than anticipated in a very
short period of time. However, we succeeded in developing a
workable electronic system and developed a substantial backlog
with many of the well known aerospace and defense companies.
Thus, we needed substantial additional financing that could
only be produced through a public underwriting. Hence, my early
encounter with Bill King. I think I can briefly capsule the next
four or five years. We were most successful in developing our
company with resulting profits, cash flow and personnel. We
acquired several small companies involved in complementary
technologies and products. We were now technologically and
financially capable of expanding our business and competing with
some of the major firms.
I guess perhaps my biggest thrill came in 1959 when we
competed with the GE's and RCA's and, through our electronic
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capabilities, won a prime systems contract, worth approximately
$50 million, to develop the very low frequency (VLF) station
that would communicate with the Polaris submarines submerged
throughout the world. This was an enormous technical breakthrough and it whetted our appetite to become what is called a
"prime systems contractor."
Thus in late 1959 and early 1960 we were very thriving and
successful electronic company with $40 million in sales, congenerically oriented and ambitious to expand beyond our existing
fields of endeavor.
In the early part of 1960, we had a wonderful opportunity to
merge our company with that of the Temco Corporation, also in
Dallas. I was particularly pleased because this tripled our net
worth, added substantial profits and gave use more than 1,200
competent engineers and one and a half million square feet in
new facilities.
Most importantly, the combined companies gave us a better
chance to compete in the prime systems area against some of the
largest electronics and aerospace companies in America.
In fact, Temco had received a substantial prime systems contract in the development of the Corvus Missile which, oversimplified, could be air launched some 70 to 100 miles from
the target to destroy defensive anti-aircraft radar sets. The missile
would lock in on the electromagnetic force generated by the
protective radar system, home in on it, and even if the radar was
cut off, a special memory tracking system would guide the missile
to its target. Actually, in preliminary tests from 75 miles out the
missile had an accuracy that enabled it to hit within 15 to 30 feet
of a radar target.
However, as luck would have it, within ten days after the LingTemco merger the Corvus Missile Program became a casualty of
the defense budget and was cancelled. (Think incidentally what
that missile could do today in Viet Nam if we had produced it.)
This program had an estimated $400 million production value.
Needless to say, this contract cancellation was a severe blow
but we were still viable financially as well as technically.
Our next significant phase occurred about 60 days later when
we were approached to purchase the Chance Vought Corporation,
our next door neighbor in Grand Prairie, Texas. Chance Vought
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also had undergone contract cancellations with a potential of approximately $800 million a few months prior. A number of dissident shareholders and brokerage firms sold us approximately
20% of the shares which was not enough for absolute control of
CVC. The management resisted our purchase of those shares for
some strange and unknown reasons. For the first time in my life
I had to make a decision even more drastic than the one I made
with Bill King some 5 years earlier.
I took those same securities that had been liberated from
Bill's escrow agreement and borrowed, along with some of my
associates, some $10 million to help Ling-Temco buy additional
shares for control. Now, before you jump to the conclusion that
there was a conflict of interest here, let me advise you that LingTemco was out of cash and the principal banks would not finance
us any further except for working capital to carry on our day-today affairs.
We merged our companies in a few months, despite some
rather ridiculous objections by the Justice Department. We had to
fight a last-hour lawsuit that, in effect, alleged we would be unfair competition to the Douglas Company, Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed and other aerospace giants. There is no question
in our mind, then or now, that this was an irresponsible act.
Thank God for the checks and balances of the judicial system.
After many months and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands
of dollars, the Federal Judge in Dallas ruled in our favor. The
Justice Department did not contest the decision.
We then discovered many of the reasons why we had received
the strange opposition from the management of CVC. We know
that as a result of contract cancellations they had gone into a very
ill-advised and random diversification effort.
We knew they had major problems but I assure you that we
underestimated the size and scope of those problems. That random
diversification effort by CVC had resulted in operational and nonrecurring charges, never previously disclosed, of some $25 million.
LTV, on December 31, 1961, had a net worth of some $18 million
and long and short term debt of $112 million. Contracts on hand
in the aerospace division had probably less than two years of
visible backlog.
Gentlemen, the hard decisions were before us: lay-offs, consoli-
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dations, re-trenching and the various traumas, agonies and moral
deterioration that always accompany a reorganization catharsis.
Now, let me share with you the additional personal trauma
that was compounded by the total events.
Some of our wiser senior and older directors felt that, as a
result of the vicious personal attacks made against me by the
principals of CVC, I might overreact if I were Chief Executive
Officer of the company. They felt I should become Chairman of
the Executive Committee. Needless to say, I was not in the least
receptive to this idea but I took the assignment in order to keep
harmony.
It was as a result of my assignment as Chairman of the
Executive Committee that I discovered losses CVC had not disclosed. I virtually condemned myself to financial oblivion as a
result of making the decision to reflect those losses in 1961 as
opposed to spreading them out over a 4 or 5 year period.
Many responsible people involved in my personal banking
relationships felt that I should sell off all of my securities for repayment of debt as opposed to allowing me to orderly dispose of
other assets I had which would have provided the same results.
(I was not broke.) I felt chagrined, disappointed and hurt. In the
next few months I tackled, as Chairman of the Executive Committee, the assignment of disposing of many of the unfavorable
assets and divisions acquired by the predecessor company. At the
same time, we developed an operational structure that would
hopefully permit us to survive and eventually grow.
Just for a bit of aside information, our securities had been
selling in the mid $30 range and within a short period of time,
after the charge-off announcement, dropped to the $15 range.
Obviously, many persons, contrary to the Justice Department's
view that we would become an unfair competitor to the giants in
the aerospace industry, felt that we were on the verge of bankruptcy. Based on a ratio of $13 million in net worth and $112
million in debt there was a strong case to be made in their favor.
In early 1963, I was the proud possessor of only 11 shares of
LTV stock, but I had the pleasure of being nominated to the
position of Chief Executive Officer of LTV. I accepted enthusiastically.
I made a vow that never again would any company for which I
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was responsible be dependent upon any one market, any one
product, or any one technology. Our concept would be that we
would continually and on a sustained basis seek diversification.
This, gentlemen, is why we have become a conglomerate. We are
a diversified company today, as the result of some rather unique
experiences some six years ago. That's why.
I guess you now would call us a conglomerate, although we
did not know that such a word existed in those days. We know
now why we became a conglomerate-now, how did we go about it?
We devoted the next several years to the restructuring of the
then new Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. We aligned straightforward
technological divisions and disposed of those business structures
that were not compatible to our long range planning. In view of
the fact that our after-tax earnings were estimated to be in the
$3 million to $5 million area for the next several years, it was
completely predictable that we would spend the rest of our
corporate productive lives paying off that enormous debt.
One could observe that if we could manage a 15% compound
earnings growth, year in and year out, starting with a $4 million
earnings base, and assuming no capital expenditures beyond
depreciation or cash dividends, it was quite predictable that it
would take about 11 years to repay our substantial long and short
term obligations.
There were no acquisitions for a period of years. We spent our
time developing from within.
However, our balance sheet by December 31, 1964, consisted
of $29 million in equity and $60 million in total indebtedness.
In other words, we had reduced our long term debt by 50% and
our equity was up 123% as a result of several years of tax-free
earnings, disposition of certain assets, and new economies.
During that three-year period of time, we went through every
known exercise to develop resources for generating cash flow
efficiencies, and through these experiences we developd a hardcore group of dedicated corporate executives, a corporate expertise,
and experience rarely available to any group of people as a unit.
The experience of starting from such a disadvantage was accorded
to a group of young, but reasonably seasoned executives who
represented the best talent of our predecessor companies.
The LTV corporate experience of the past few years has in-
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cluded many acquisitions, both large and small, at the parent
company level as well as the subsidiary level. We have had scores
of new financings, as well as bank lines that have produced well
over one and a half billion dollars in new financings. We have disposed of several companies and many unrelated product lines. We
have filed and executed nearly 100 registration statements. We

have literally undergone every corporate reorganization and realignment that can be devised by mere mortals.
Thus, today, we of the corporate staff, represent in varying
degrees the financial as well as the ownership conscience of 11
publicly owned companies. The total market value of the parent
companies as well as the subsidiary securities is in excess of $2
billion.
Reaching this level did not come easily. Unquestionably the
first giant step was taken in early 1965 when we conceived and
developed what came to be known as "Project Redeployment." I
think most of the SEC staff members as well as the blue sky commissioners will remember our Project Redeployment concept
which we kicked-off in early 1965.
Under the Project Redeployment concept-this was really the
first stage of becoming a conglomerate-we allocated certain of the
assets to the parent company and the remaining to our aerospace
corporation, our military electronics corporation, and our consumer electronics company.
We then, in a most unique method through an exchange in
cash and our three new subsidiaries' securities for that of the
parent company stock, created a public market in each of those
companies.
Being publicly owned, each subsidiary became its own profit
center, technological center, market center, credit center, and,
most important, its own management motivation center. Each,
being publicly owned, developed access to the private and public
financial markets.
LTV, on the other hand, had no credit responsibility for
either the long or short term debt of its publicly owned subsidiaries (not to any practical degree). Thus we severed the financial umbilical cord to each of these companies and freed the
parent company so that it might progress on its own.
Being insulated one from the other through public ownership,

KmNiTcKy

LAw JoNAL[o

[Vol. 57,

and the only common tie being that of being owned by LTV as
parent, a catastrophe in one would not be contagious. More
importantly, public ownership would place an identifiable value
on the efforts, capabilities and the assets of each of these companies. Equally important, each of the individual corporation
managements' equity stakes was inextricably equated to its own
performance.
As a result of our Project Redeployment philosophy, we became, according to Fortune Magazine, one of the most visible
companies in America, simply because each of the companies
being publicly owned, must publish its various quarterly, annual
and semi-annual reports.
Now, let's examine the financial status of LTV on December
31, 1967. LTV, Inc. (unconsolidated) had total cash in the bank
of $72 million and the market value of our subsidiaries and other
assets equated to $858 million. Thus, total assets approximated
$930 million. At the same time, LTV, the parent company, was
completely free of bank debt and had only $52 million of long
term debt. After allowing for income taxes in the event we
decided to sell our securities, we would have had a net asset value
of approximately $700 million. The validity of Project Redeployment without any reservations has been proven.
We have been asked many times-where do you go from here?
What is your long term goal? Let me say we do have monthly
objectives, yearly projections and 5-year plans, but we have, under
our concept, no ultimate or terminal goal. Our objective for the
future, as it has been in the past, is to continue internal development through new products, new ideas, and new companies. Additionally, we will make acquisitions, and I'll predict to you that
in another five years we will be much larger than we are today and
in lieu of having some 11 publicly owned companies in our
portfolio, we will possibly have as many as 25 or 30.
It would then be entirely predictable that our objectives, goals
and convictions towards internal and external growth will be the
same. In other words, we shall continue to be a good customer of
the SEC and the other "blue sky" commissioners.
The question has been asked-why your determination to build
a company such as LTV? Why do you want to produce growth?
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My answer is as follows: You first must understand and accept the
principle that if you are publicly owned, the primary reason for
your existence and your primary function is to generate lasting
values and additional earnings per share for the benefit of your
shareholders. Once you have accepted that principle, then it's a
matter of being obligated to carry out your responsibilities.
Let me chat a minute about the overall social values and
economic implications that a company such as LTV makes not
only to the economy but to the community in which it exists, to
our country and to the free world. The end result of any successful enterprise is that you become a good corporate citizen, you
are able to help to a significant degree the various charitable
drives, you are able to contribute to the various educational
systems. You are able to take indigent persons and make them taxpaying employees.
In the purchase of many of our companies we have paid substantial premiums over the market price which has permitted
literally thousands and thousands of persons to have a better
economic life. The premiums that we have paid for the securities
have been at usually historic highs or a big percentage over their
existing price. Thus the premiums have generated substantial income taxes for the Treasury Department. It has been estimated that
we in the acquisition of J & L and Wilson & Co., paid approximately $200 million premium for those companies. In the
financing of these companies we have, through our Eurodollar
loans, repatriated approximately $125 million to the United
States, substantially aiding the U.S. balance of payments and the
Treasury Department.
We have become financially and technically competitive with
the aerospace giants and have successfully competed on many
major prime systems contracts on a firm fixed-cost basis that has
saved our government and taxpayers many millions of dollars.
As a result of our internal growth, just in Dallas alone, our
overall employment has increased from some 8,000 persons in
1962 to some 30,000 employees as of this date. And, our 5-year
forecast, again in the Dallas area, is that our employment should
almost double. Again, I would emphasize through internal growth,
not through acquisitions.
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Rarely do we acquire a financially, or management-troubled
company, but occasionally we do. Let me illustrate by taking our
acquisition of the Okonite Company as an example.
Okonite was owned for a number of years by Kennecott
Copper Company and they, in turn, were ordered to divest their
ownership as a result of an anti-trust action which revolved around
the integrated concept.
According to testimony in the federal courtroom in New York,
some 73 companies indicated an interest in Okonite. We, the 74th
company, purchased Okonite. Under our stewardship and management, this company which had shown losses for some 4 of the last
6 years prior to our acquisition, has accrued or paid more taxes in
the last two years than the company earned in the preceding nine
years. Employment in that company as a result of pure internal
growth is up some 40% and predicted to be even higher in the
next several years. So, you see, we do pump social and economic
values into the companies we acquire.
Thus, I hope you will agree with me that we at LTV are
responsible people who are making a contribution to this country
through our efforts and endeavors.
Now I would like, in summary, to develop what I hope would
be final constructive comments concerning the various agencies.
I sincerely believe that the Justice Department, the FTC and
the SEC must develop a set of ground rules that would apply to
all of the employees in those agencies. The ground rules would
prohibit irresponsible statements or personal interpretation of
policy that could have a devastating effect on the lives of many
thousands of investors and scores and scores of companies. These
ground rul:!s would provide discipline to those persons in government agencies who make such irresponsible statements.
I think that we all agree that it is improper, unethical and
perhaps illegal for anyone in the agencies to develop notoriety
and personal attention by attacking the so-called "conglomerate
corporate structure." They are merely taking advantage and calling
attention to a very faddish word, as opposed to respecting the very
basic rights of the individuals employed in those conglomerates
and the shareholders who own those conglomerates.
As an illustration, one gentleman in the justice Department
recently, in a public speech, referred to LTV as a "Patchwork
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Creature" which I am sure you agree is a most derogatory statement, offensive and damaging and an insult to our company.
I believe that disciplinary action is in order in this case.
(Incidentally, this gentleman's whole speech was inflammatory,
insulting and loaded with allegations and implications concerning
the conglomerate structure and LTV in particular.) There was an
implication that this speech was representative of the Justice
Department policy. I personally intend to find out whether or not
the Justice Department approved this man's speech. His irresponsible talk, along with one or two other public announcements,
caused a devastating and erosive effect in the public market place
of the conglomerate securities.
I hope that Mr. Ramsey Clark would agree with me that
disciplinary action is in order. Let me quote Mr. Clark. In a
recent letter he pointed out that:
It is of fundamental importance that the Department of
Justice never lend its name or knowledge to public or private
accusations of criminal, immoral, unethical or other wrongful
conduct, except in legal proceedings where relevant to a case.
The accusatory power of the department must never be used
openly or covertly, expressly or implicitly, merely to inform
the public or to injure or defame any person. To do so would
change not only the nature of this department, but of our
nation as well. No such action shall ever be permitted while
I am Attorney General. Anyone violating this principle will
be subject to stern disciplinary action.
We shall see.
It is my hope that as a result of my presentation to you today,
that we, the joint representatives of free enterprise, industry and
agency, can through our exchange of thoughts and ideas produce
something that would result in a more meaningful and productive
relationship.
It is my hope that we, agency and business, can develop a set
of rules for the agencies as well as for industry to operate within.
We cannot let individuals in industry or agency try to interpret
policy in an abstract or subjective manner.
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AN OUTSIDER LOOKS AT CONGLOMERATES
By EUGENE F. MOONEY*
PARABLE OF CONGLOMERATES, OR,
To

"THAT AIN'T THE WAY IT 'SPOZED

BE"

Long before Time began we started having troubles with
conglomerating. Freud's Oedipus Legend recites that the Primeval
Father had a family business with the Primeval Mother as its
primary asset and the Brother Clan as the minority stockholders.
One day the brothers approached the Father and proposed they
share the assets a little more. The Father grew wroth and flatly
rejected the proposition on grounds it was indecent, and, besides,
"That ain't the way it 'spozed to be." Well. The brothers had a
stockholder's meeting, revolted, killed the Father and confiscated
the Mother. Thereafter the Human Family Company diversified
into several different colored subsidiaries.
Our next encounter with the problem came a little while after
Time did begin. When God set up the Holy Land Company he
made Moses the proprietor and the Children of Israel were the
stockholders. The Ten Articles of Incorporation prohibited
acquiring new Gods and alien women and such like. Everything
worked out fine for a time, then the stockholders asked why they
couldn't diversify through mergers like the other companies. The
Priests told them it was indecent, and, besides, "That ain't the way
it 'spozed to be." Well. The company eventually attracted the attention of a big corporate raider up North named Julius Caesar
who owned the Roman Empire Company. He swooped down one
day, cleaned out the old management and merged the two companies-calling the new one the Holy Roman Empire.
During the Rennaissance Period the English built a tidy
little company on an island. When she learned the world was
round, Queen Elizabeth proposed they expand into the new
markets by mergers. After some debate the Lords decided it would
be indecent, and, besides "That ain't the way it 'spozed to be."
Well. When Elizabeth heard the Spanish had put out tender
offers to the Indians, she set up some land companies and sent Sir
Walter Raleigh to look for bargains in the New World. He forced
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
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out the old management in Virginia, bought up control over
Manhattan for $24 and set up thirteen subsidiaries under tight
central management control. Everything looked great until a
group of dissident stockholders led by George Washington revolted, split off from the parent company and went into competition with it.
So you see when we all came over to this country we knew
just how to handle conglomerates:
First-Set up the industrial family on product lines, let the
Fathers have the Mothers and keep the kids off the Street;
Second-Set up a long list of religious prohibitions to prevent
diversification into other Gods and other women;
Third-When new markets appear, let the Indians keep them;
Finally-If anyone complains about the rules, tell them it
would be indecent to conglomerate, and besides, "That ain't the
way it 'spozed to be."
I.

THE BIG PICTURE, OR, "WHAT'S HAPPENING HERE?"

Let's look first at the big picture. Since 1950 we have had more
than 183,504 corporations in this country. Most of these have
assets less than $5 million-some 180,000 plus-and about 3,000
have assets of $5 million to $100 million, while 458 have assets of
$100 million to $1 billion.
The first large-scale merger movement in this country came
during the period after the Civil War and before the Depression,
characterized by the creation of the big Trusts-Standard Oil, the
Sugar Trust, AT&cT. This movement was dampened by the
Sherman, Clayton and Public Utility Holding Company acts,
among others, and finally checked by the Depression.
The present interest in conglomerates is an outgrowth of concern with the Twentieth Century merger movement. Beginning
after WW II, merger activity again became common.
The F.T.C. has kept records since 1948 recording the disappearance of companies through large mergers. Between 1948 and
1967 there were 1,075 large disappearances, involving a total $39.4
billion in assets. The figures show an accelerating trend of more
and bigger mergers.
The F.T.C. issued a report in March, 1968, noting that again
last year there was an increase in merger activity. There were
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2,384 mergers in 1967. Indeed, in the field of manufacturing and
mining, the largest field, there were 1,496 mergers in 1967, a
50% gain over the 995 in 1966. The significance of this is enhanced when one realizes that there were 155 so-called "large"
mergers-namely, those involving an acquired company with assets
over $10 million-for a total of over $8 billion aggregate assets
acquired by mergers during 1967. Conglomerate mergers accounted for 83% of these acquisitions, or, approximately $6.6
billion in corporate assets was acquired by means of conglomerating. Last year alone the 200 largest U.S. corporations acquired 41
large manufacturing and mining firms with total assets of $3.7
billion.
This pattern of growing diversification in an increasing
merger movement has become more pronounced since WW II.
The rate of diversification more than doubled after 1950,
measured by the annual rate of entry into new industrial activities.
An F.T.C. report in 1955 asserted that of the 2,091 acquisitions
from 1951 to 1954, some 945 of them were diversification mergers.
By 1960 roughly a third of all manufacturing acquisitions were
outside the broad industry classes of the acquiring companies as
defined in the Bureau of Census Standard Industrial Classification
Code.
This year promises to be larger and perhaps more spectacular
than 1967. In addition, the 1968 mergers, especially by conglomerates, contains a new dimension-the combining of financing concerns and industrials. A recent newspaper article points out this
feature and lists the following 1968 acquisitions:
-Gulf and Western acquired a large stake in Associates Investment Company
-City Investing acquired United Insurance Company
-Control Data merged with Commercial Credit Corp.
-Xerox proposes to merge with C.I.T.
-AMK Corporation and National General Corporation are
wrestling for control of Great American Holding Corp.
The newspaper article suggested that these industrial conglomerates find themselves needing a stable source of short-term
financing money for one or another of their operating companies
and are thus acquiring one through merger.
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One can foresee increased conglomerating in the rapidly growing holding company movement in the insurance and banking
industry. This appears to be much the same as expansion of industrials into the financing world, but it seems to me quite different. Banks and insurance companies are essentially investment
institutions, not short-term financing institutions. I have elsewhere remarked that it appears these otherwise conservative investment institutions appear not only to want the capacity to
have pups, but also wish to be able to whelp geese and turtles
and elephants. This may present some unique problems in the
future if industrial subsidiaries of banks or insurers issue stock
for public sale in a securities market in which the parent or a
sister subsidiary are investors. The financial conglomerate might
well turn out to be both a buyer and seller of its own securities
on a much larger scale than do today's industrial conglomerates.
That it likely would not embarrass them is indicated by the
instances in which the loan department of a big bank finds itself
lending money to a corporation whose stock is being purchased
by the bank's trust department.
The implications to securities regulatory agencies seems to me
to be apparent.
II.

OTHER VIEWPOINTS, OR,

"IT DEPENDS ON WHAT You'RE LOOKING FoR"

This frenetic merger movement has not gone totally unnoticed
by others. The F.T.C. and Antitrust Division of the Justice Department began looking at it some time back, and both Fortune
Magazine and the Academic community seem to have discovered
it about the same time last year.
A. The Antitrust View, or
"We Protect Competition Even If We Kill It"
The trustbusters were the first to become alarmed about
mergers. Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 as
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Essentially, that provision of the
antitrust law prohibits mergers having an anticompetitive effect on
commerce. Since then the federal enforcement agencies have kept
fairly busy on mergers. Although it started late and ran slowly the
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F.T.C. has attacked 81 mergers involving $2 billion in assets since
1965, and four-fifths of these have involved manufacturing companies. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has also
been active. By 1966 some thirty lawsuits had been prosecuted in
the federal courts against various types of mergers.
The new Antitrust Guidelines issued last year reflected exHarvard Law Professor Donald Turner's views on conglomerates
-set forth at length in his 1965 Harvard Law Review articleand seemed to take a charitable view of them. On the other hand,
the Marcn, 1968, report of the F.T.C. stated that agency would
commence prosecuting conglomerate mergers this year with more
energy and diligence than before. Since the antitrust view is the
oldest one concerning conglomerates perhaps we should examine
it briefly.
The most unique aspect of this antitrust law dimension of
conglomerates is the analytical viewpoint of the Antitrust Division,
the F.T.C. and the courts. That analytical approach-seldom
acknowledged but obviously the most influential single theoretical
work in the field-was first set forth in 1933 in a slim little volume
entitled THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION by a young
economist named Edward Champerlin. His thesis leads to so-called
"Structure analysis" of competition.
Proceeding on a theoretical framework of the economic structure of American business viewed in terms of industries, firms and
products, trustbusters try to preserve competition. The Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Enforce the
Antitrust Laws, issued in 1950, set forth a salutary but rather
vague preserving goal of overall workable competition.
The traditional trustbusters classify mergers as horizontal,
vertical or conglomerate. The F.T.C. classifies them as productextension, market-extension and other. Essentially this viewpoint
sees horizontal mergers as combinations between competitors
eliminating competition, vertical mergers are those between suppliers and customers foreclosing competition in a given industry,
(so-called upstream or downstream mergers), and anything else is
called a conglomerate merger. True conglomerates do not fit
neatly into the trustbuster's analytical structure and can thus be
considered anticompetitive only if the particular merger presents
the possibility of anticompetitive economic effects, such as re-
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ciprocity between a subsidiary which is a supplier to a newlyacquired competitor of a sister subsidiary, or an acquisition foreclosing a potential entrant into a different industry. Needless to
say, such effects are difficult to establish.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is also coming to be viewed as
embodying a national policy against undue concentration in industry, and thus prohibiting combinations having a substantially
concentrating effect. Horizontal mergers eliminating even a small
firm obviously have this tendency, vertical and conglomerate
mergers less clearly so. The Brown Shoe Co. case in 1964 and the
Chlorox decision in 1967 adopt this "market" oriented theoretical
framework for analyzing the antitrust effects of mergers. In its
essence, the trustbusters are trying to inhibit the growth of
oligopolistic economic structures-that is, industries dominated by
a few sellers. Only miniscule shares of the product or geographic
market may be involved.
Of the thirty merger cases prosecuted during the past 18
years, twelve were purely horizontal, five were purely vertical, five
were both horizontal and vertical, three were both conglomerate
and either horizontal or vertical, and only two were purely
conglomerate. One of these was the Chlorox case.
I think it notable that although the trustbusters have lost very
few merger cases, one they lost in the lower courts concerned the
merger of Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc. and Chance-Vought
Corporation. They lost because they were unable to make the
court see something called an "aerospace" industry in which LTV
would have substantial foreclosure impact on GE, General Dynamics and other defense contracting giants.
B. The Fortune Magazine View, or
"Gee Look What's Happening Out West!"
If the trustbusters view the conglomerate movement with
growing alarm and consternation, FortuneMagazine as the spokesman for the industrial establishment views it with growing awe
and respect.
Fortune Magazine discovered Mr. Ling in its January, 1967,
issue article entitled "Jimmy Ling's Wonderful Growth Machine."
Doubtlessly written because LTV was the fastest growing corporation on Fortune's list of 500, the article focussed on Mr. Ling
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personally and his rise to affluence, detailing the complicated
financial maneuvering required to put together LTV without the
help of the Eastern capital establishment. On the whole Fortune
was a little disapproving of his financing techniques and somewhat
condescending toward this latest Texas whizbang.
Having discovered LTV, Fortune then began to educate us
about conglomerates. Its next issue warned of the management
difficulties in conglomerating in an article entitled "The Perils of
the Multi-market Corporation." That article pointed out smugly
that such companies as Litton, Textron and FMC were not really
much different from Grace c Co., I.T.T. and R.C.A., they all had
their limitations and management flexibility was one of them. It
examined the diversification troubles of CBS in an article entitled
"CBS: Bad Day At Black Rock." Then in June, 1967, after examining the earnings per share record of their top 500 companies
Fortune noted that conglomerates didn't really do much better
than everyone else in an article entitled "The Odd News About
Conglomerates."
A year later in an article entitled "Gulf k Western's Rambunctious Conservatism," Fortunenoted patronizingly that G & W
had decided to drop its policy of frequent acquisition as a way to
growth and diversification. And the April, 1968, issue carried a
positively lip-smacking article entitled "Litton Down to Earth,"
detailing that conglomerate's present troubles.
The current Fortune view was set forth in its editorial in the
June, 1968, issue featuring the top 500 corporations. Entitled "The
New Sophistication," the editorial anointed conglomerates as the
vanguards of the emerging "new corporate forms" and identified
James Ling as the innovator. In the words of the editorial:
The heart of the matter is Ling's discovery that when you
build a conglomerate business empire, you don't have to put
all its parts in one corporation-that, in fact, there may be
distinct advantages in keeping the elements separate, or
even in breaking apart elements that were in one piece when
they were first acquired.
The editorial went on to give as its example Ling's decision to split
the Wilson Company into three parts-meatpacking, pharmaceuticals and sporting goods-because the latter two "tend to have more
sex appeal on Wall Street" while investors tended to look at the
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old Wilson Company as just another low-earning meatpacker. The editorial writer also picked up another basic theme
in conglomerates when he noted that the investor in conglomerates
might well be persuaded to forego dividends in favor of capital
growth where the conglomerate itself by its corporate acquisitions
in effect invested his money for him. (I wonder if the Mutual
Funds have seen this new form of competition?)
In summary, the Fortune editorial told its readers that:
One byproduct of these new modes of thought is an increased acceptance by business managers of the view that
a limit on investment opportunities in one's own line implies
an obligation to put capital to work in others.
C. The Academic View, or, "Let's See What We Have Here"
Business academicians also have recently discovered conglomerates. Although only a few publications exist, an increasing
number of studies of growth by acquisition, diversification or
corporate expansion may be expected. I found at least three different analytical viewpoints toward these primary characteristics
of conglomerates.
Looking at corporate growth by acquisition in terms of the
supposed long-range policies of the acquiring company, one academic broke the subject into five parts:
1. Horizontal merger to meet new products demand;
2. Horizontal merger to reduce unit costs by achieving
economies of scale;
8. Vertical or conglomerate merger to reduce overall market
riskiness;
4. Conglomerate merger to enter a rich new product market,
5. Conglomerate merger to achieve Synergy-the "two plus
two equals five" effect.
This analysis is useful here because it identifies the kinds of conglomerate mergers which if well thought out will produce economic benefits to all and if ill-conceived will not. It also uses the
same terminology as the Justice Department Antitrust Division
thus permitting us to speculate that the first three types of merger
will likely invite attack-the last two less likely.
A closely-related academic view takes as its point of view the
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supposed motives of the company managers in terms of games
theory in making diversification mergers:
1. Offensive moves of entry into a new field in a flanking
movement on a competitor;
2. Defensive mergers to secure supply lines or customer
outlets;
8. Mergers to achieve sheer bigness;
4. Mergers which are thinly disguised investments of surplus
funds in better earning opportunities than plant expansion
5. Synergistic mergers.
You should note there is a fairly close correspondence between
these two breakdowns in terms of those mergers thought to be
economically justified. Specifically, both of these men indicated
that synergistic mergers were eminently desirable, as were
mergers to achieve economies of scale, but that horizontal mergers
simply to enter new rich fields would likely not be particularly
beneficial except in a short run until competitors followed suit,
and that purely defensive mergers and mergers merely to achieve
bigness were of little economic value, except perhaps to stabilize
earnings.
A third academic chose to look at the matter as a problem of
business expansion by merger. This resulted in the rather conventional five-part breakdown of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Horizontal expansion;
Vertical expansion;
Conglomerate expansion;
Concentric expansion;
Speculative expansion.

The first three are the conventional ones employed by the trustbusters. The fourth category-concentric expansion-was identified
as primarily a corporate management theory and the example
given could have described LTV or Litton or G &W. Speculative
expansion was dismissed as not worthy of serious academic consideration.
Essentially, the value concensus of all three men was stated by
one of these writers in these words, speaking of merger acquisitions:
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1. Conglomerate mergers will not be profitable unless they
produce synergism;
2. Horizontal mergers that combine the resources and markets
of two firms can be profitable only when-but not always
when-the firms operate at best outputs that lie beneath
the declining portion of their respective unit cost schedules
(in other words when true economies of scale are
achieved);
8. Horizontal resource mergers can be used to implement
decisions to expand output in response to increases in
demand, but they are likely to be less profitable means of
implementation than internal investment.
Even these conclusions will be modified, however, if the acquirer
has discovered a genuine, simon-pure bargain. Bargains may result from several reasons:
1. The acquired firm stock is erroneously valued too low by
the stock market as to its future earnings; so-called "forecast" bargains;
2. The acquired unit either has a lower cost of capital than
has the acquiring unit, or the combination will produce
one-"cost of capital" bargains;
3. "Mismanagement" bargains;
4. Tax bargains;
5. Negotiations bargains.
The writer summarizes his studies by noting that the three possible
sources of absolute and long-range profit increases are: 1) increased
demand for the firm's product; 2) technological advances which
create new demand or reduce unit costs; and 3) unexploited
synergism. He summarizes thus:
In a world in which the probability of being able to buy
other firms at bargain prices was negligible, there would be
only one of these three sets of investment opportunities that
a firm could also exploit profitably by merger: the opportunity
to induce synergism by entering a related industry. (p. 285)
For those of you who would like to know more about the concept
of "synergism" I direct your attention to page 259 of a book entitled The CorporateMerger by Alberts and Segall (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1966), where Mr. Alberts explains the idea in terms of
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algebraic formulations, totally untranslatable by us ordinary
mortals.
III. THE INVESTORS VIW, OR, "WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME?"
The investor in this country is heavily conditioned to believe
that he is being protected by securities regulators against fraud in
the securities market. I suspect he believes the SEC keeps off the
market unsafe securities and will not allow stock transactions
which will hurt him. Everyone who remembers the Tucker car
promotion after WW II or who understands the inherent limitations in the full disclosure philosophy, knows better. I am reasonably sure that very few laymen realize that our securities regulatory apparatus does not come to grips with the central problems of merger acquisitions involving exchanges of securities.
To nail this down further we need to note that the federal tax
laws strongly influence the forms of corporate acquisitions, and,
coupled with the antitrust pressure previously noted, are strongly
influencing the shape of the accelerating merger movement.
We are all aware of the three forms of so-called "tax-free
reorganizations" under IRC 268 (a) (1) : A-Statutory mergers, BStock for stock mergers, C-Stock for assets transfers. Without discussing the ramifications of all the three forms, the B and C forms
require use of the securities of the acquiring corporation to acquire
the stock or assets of another corporation, and result not only in
tax-free exchanges but also permit wondrous accounting results
concerning liquidity, depreciation bases, loss and gain carry overs,
equity dilution, earnings per share and poolings. When one puts
together the tax and antitrust laws with our remarkable economic
growth in both production and consumption he winds up with a
strong feeling that the FourntueMagazine prognostications may be
accurate concerning conglomerates being the wave of the corporate
future. Moreover, future conglomerate merger activity will ride on
tax-free securities transactions whenever possible.
This would seem to suggest that the SEC is vitally involved in
the matter. Such is not quite the case. The SEC's "no-sale theory"
embodied in Rule 133 has always exempted from its registration
requirements stock exchanges in mergers. More startling, however,
mergers were until recently considered outside the SEC's antifraud
requirements.
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This reading of 3 (a) grew up with the SEC. In 1951 the
Commission reaffirmed its Rule 133 policy concerning registration, but although it did not expressly extend the theory to
antifraud, old case law may have settled the matter at that time.
In 1943 the Ninth Circuit in Nat'l. Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1943), held that a
merger was not subject to the antifraud provisions, irrespective
of the fraudulent aspects of the transaction, and the SEC amicus
curiae brief supported the ruling. The bases for this position were
threefold: 1) logical consistency demanded that Rule 133 cut
across both registration and antifraud; 2) a merger is technically
neither purchase nor sale under Sec. 3 (a) ; and 3) nothing in the
federal legislation indicates otherwise. There is vaguely contrary
case authority in the 1965 case of Voege v. American Sumatra
Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.Del. 1965) ; H. L. Green Co.
v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) and Vine v. Beneficial Finance, 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). Last year in the case
of SEC v. National Securities, 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1967), in
Arizona the SEC sought directly to undo an insurance company
merger by enjoining violations of the antifraud provisions of the
'34 Act. They lost on a McCarran Act point-but the U.S. Supreme
Court has granted certiorari and hopefully will reach the underlying antifraud point when it decides the case this coming Term.
[Author's Note: It did. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 89 S.
Ct. 564 (1969) .1
The Rule seems clearly to exempt type A and type C mergers.
Type B mergers are of course covered by the '33 Act and a
registration statement must be filed.
To date the SEC has continued to look askance at merger
transactions whereby corporate acquisitions are effected, conglomerate or otherwise-but has moved affirmatively only on so-called
"tender offers" by recently prescribing tentative reporting rules
on information to be filed upon initial broadcast of the offer. In
great measure the conglomerate merger acquisition is only marginally touched by the SEC, and then only if it engages in relatively
conventional highbindering. Private 10b actions are currently
probing every exposed nerve in mergers-including the "no sale"
theory-but these lawsuits only enlighten the SEC-not involve it.
The State Securities Commissioners? Ironically enough, the
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states themselves could take a giant step in helping change the
impact of the current judicial interpretation of Section 3 (a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act. You recall one of the theories supporting Rule 133 theory is that a merger is neither a "purchase"
nor "sale" within the statutory meaning of Section 3 (a). The
reason it is not, runs the argument, is because whether a merger is
a sale is dependent upon state corporation laws which prescribe it
is not because of the involuntary act of the stockholder in a
merger. This is specious reasoning in my opinion. However, simply
by changing those state corporation laws one of the foundation
stones of the no sale theory disappears.
But it seems to me preferable to approach the matter affirmatively rather than back into it. I hear it said frequently that the
states should either get into the securities regulation business or
get out of it altogether. The potential market for "small" mergers
consists of 180,000 plus firms with assets less than $10 million.
Perhaps the State Commissioners should move into the field of
merger acquisitions. That is easier said than conceived and easier
conceived than executed, not only because of the well-known
jurisdictional problems where multistate transactions are involved,
but also because of the heterogeneity of the state securities laws
themselves. In addition, most state securities statutes exempt nonpublic offerings-which would cover most transfers of control
stock to a corporate acquirer-and so far as I know, all state
securities laws exclude transfers or exchanges of securities pursuant
to a consolidation or merger. This specific transactions exclusion
is an itemized workout of the Rule 133 no sale theory sutured into
the Uniform Act by its drafters.
Does this foreclose the matter for the State Securities Commissioner? I think not. Some of you may well be politically potent
or persuasive enough to bring about radical surgery by your
legislatures. Indeed, it seems to me somewhat ironic that many of
the old state securities laws displaced by the Uniform Act might
well reach conglomerate mergers where the new one will not.
Maybe you could get parts of your old acts back.
More feasibly, however, most state acts contain a broadlyworded rule making provision which might be exploited. For example, one seeking to take advantage of an exemption must apply
for it and in a certain fashion by virtue of a Commissioner's
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Regulation. Could he not similarly by rule require that one seeking to take advantage of an exclusion file some sort of notice of the
proposed merger? Indeed, in at least one situation of which I am
aware the exclusion of nonprofit church bonds from the securities
coverage registration provisions of a "full disclosure" type of
state act did not foreclose the State Commissioner from applying
the transactions coverage to issue regulations requiring church
bond dealers to register as dealers and apply for an exemption.
This feat of administrative manipulation was carried out under
his general rule-making authority in the Uniform Act. I have no
doubt that the antifraud provisions of that state act could have
been applied to a proper case involving those same church bond
dealers. I suspect State Securities Commissioners with "fair,
just and equitable" statutes might find it even easier to use their
rule-making power to frame regulations applicable to merger
situations than would those with pure "disclosure" acts.
The matter of statutory coverage by state acts is certainly not
free from doubt or complexity-but SEC staff attitudes in the case
of closely held companies plus judicial feedback from the lOb
decisions foreshadow erosion of the no-sale theory-and what then
of the state act exclusion? Blue-sky lawyers speak of these
anomalies between state and federal acts in pungent one-syllable
terms.
But extension of state law coverage to merger related exchanges does not solve the problem, whether one thinks in terms
of full disclosure or of fairness to the stockholders. Indeed, it but
raises difficult problems relating to what must be disclosed and
how the transatcion may be explained to others.
The nitty-gritty of tax-free mergers to an affected shareholder
is the ratio of exchange of stock for stock or stock for assets. And
the essence of this process is the valuation formula used to equate
the stocks. Without going into elaborate detail concerning this
difficult matter, I would recommend to you an excellent little
study by Lynn E. Dellabarger entitled Common Stock Valuation
in IndustrialMergers published by the University of Florida Press
in 1966. In a detailed study of fifty mergers he examines the
primary and modifying value factors actually operating in those
mergers. The five primary factors examined related to the ratios of
earnings per share for one year and for five years prior, common
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market prices for the prior quarter, per share book values and
cash dividends for the past year. The modifying factors were
trend of earnings, stability of earnings, leverage, cash assets, and
overall financial strength. He concludes that "the influence of
market prices... was dominant throughout the analysis," (p. 140)
while book value was the least influential (p. 144). Perhaps the
most realistic method for valuing common equity was a combination of a "valuing of assets" method and a "capitalization of
earnings" method for "goodwill." He called this the "hybrid"
method.
Dellabarger points out the possible defects in these two preferred methods of valuing equity for merger purposes. The
obvious one is that the same financial measuring rod must be
used to value the assets and earnings of both companies in the
hybrid method or we wind up measuring the apples by the pound
and the oranges by the bushel. Similarly, the market prices approach is usable only with respect to stock which has enough float
for the market to value it, and even then the market price may
reflect persistent over or under valuation because of speculation
or technical reasons. Quite clearly the market price approach is
fundamentally questionable where control is involved for the
reason that the market has never valued that element in the trading price of the stock. The very essence of merger acquisitions-by
negotiation or by tender offer-is transfer of control and thus exchange ratios based solely on market would be misleading. The
"premium" paid for control compensates for this.
The obvious observation is that an evaluator actually sets
exchange ratios by market values plus the other methods and
drives as hard a bargain as possible.
Perhaps the next most difficult set of regulatory problems are
essentially accounting matters. Whether "pooling of assets" or
"purchase" accounting treatments may be used to report the
financial effects of a merger relate primarily to the earnings
picture; and relate indirectly to market prices for companies
whose stock is traded publicly or which must be reported. The
obvious abuses of outright violations of "generally accepted accounting principles" are relatively simple to police compared to
a situation apparently permitted by such principles but which
permits such disparate reporting. The essence of the difference
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between whether a given acquisition is a purchase or a pooling
lies in the fact that in purchases a premium paid for goodwill
should be amortized against earnings while in a pooling no such
apparent drain occurs. A bargain may thus be "purchased" in order
to enhance earnings while a premium price may be substantially
concealed under a pooling. Manipulation of the acquisition with
respect to the accounting year-end date being used can create
wildly different pictures of the financial effect of the merger.
Generally, type B or C tax-free acquisitions, coupled with an
intent to carry on a combined business operation after the merger,
are widely treated as poolings and not purchases. ARB 48-the
accounting rule which permits pooling-is thought by some to be
out of date and in need of changing. There may be some virtue
in the suggestion that permitting the acquirer to choose the
treatment it likes for public reporting purposes virtually invites
a certain distortion. In 1957 the old Committee on Accounting
Procedures, the forerunner of the Accounting Principles Board
of the American Institute of CPAs, issued an opinion that where
the companies were of disparate size the acquisition is presumptively a purchase. Unfortunately, that simplistic approach
may neither reflect the realities of today's mergers nor meet
the reporting needs.
Maybe the SEC will soon prescribe a full set of standard
accounting principles for public reporting purposes which will
meet and resolve the pooling-or-purchase problem among others.
Many other accounting or reporting problems inhere in
mergers, ranging from the treatment of securities dilution to
transfer of depreciation schedules, from dilution of earnings per
share to whether conglomerates should report earnings by division
or products. (The September 4, 1968, SEC Release prescribes for
the first time reporting of financial information by products).
But I have unduly prolonged this opinion-as the saying goes. A
recent Fortune Magazine article (June 15, 1968) discusses the
current problems in an article entitled "The Accountants Are
Changing the Rules" for those who want to know more about the
matter.
Finally, any reporting by the acquiring or acquired companies
to stockholders, the Commissioner or the public should reveal the
corporate reasons for the acquisition. These reasons must be given
in reporting tender offers under SEC regulations.
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In light of our growing understanding of the matter, the
corporate reasons for the merger can be meaningfully revealed.
The company should candidly set forth its economic expectations
concerning synergistic effects, entry into new fields, cutting costs
or whatever. There is sufficient understanding of the phenomenon
to sort out the more from the less worthy motives, the more from
the less realistic of these expectations, the more from the less
accurate descriptions of the supposed benefits being sought. Without having to pass judgment on the desirability of these corporate
expectations, the Commissioner can evaluate the reality of them.
Since these expectations are obviously material to the decision
making of management, they are similarly material to regulators
and investors and should be candidly and fully revealed.
The SEC can do what it likes concerning the LTVs of our
corporate world-but the state Securities Commissioners are responsible for the rest-all 180,000 of them.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Conglomerates may have the best of all possible corporate
worlds. Outside the major thrust of our antitrust policy because of
their corporate structure, they have little to fear from the trustbusters. Growing by means of tax sheltered transactions, they reflect their economic advances at lower capital gains rates and often
defer the tax impact indefinitely or escape it altogether. Substantially insulated from the securities laws, they buy and sell
control stock. Freed of the restraints implicit in a commitment to
produce a given product, operate within a particular firm, exist
within a given industry, thley roam across the economy. Centered
on a concept of management expertise and flexibility, they enjoy
the benefits of the emerging management techniques of systems
analysis, computer technology and PP and B administration. Their
only concern-aside from this wire-walking--may be the ubiquitous
problem of financing their eternal growth.
Since the medium of exchange for their recurring acquisitions
is their own equities, it is all-important to them that the market
price of their stock stays high and continually climbs if possible.
Consequently, corporate decisions of necessity must begin and end
with close attention to their stock prices, their paper profits, their
corporate image of growth, diversification and expansion.
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Such a situation is fraught with the temptation to lie. Managers
of conglomerates are doubtlessly no less virtuous than other menbut they are no more so either. I cite the Westec case for that
proposition.
Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon of the F.T.C. in a speech
entitled "Conglomerate Merger Fever: The 1967 Virus" and
published in the 1967 Antitrust Law Journal,remarked:
Our policy objective is not to find the ultimate "curd' for
"merger fever." The only sure-fire cure for merger fever is
a broad-spectrum antibiotic called "recession." Since this cure
is demonstrably worse than the disease, I am not advocating
its use. (p. 103 at 111)
Nor am I-might I add. Additionally, I am not at all sure I
would characterize conglomerating as a disease-yet. I have persuaded myself there is beginning a fundamental restructuring
of much of the American industrial apparatus, sparked by the
conglomerate. Perhaps "fundamental" is not quite accuratemore likely it is a movement which will create a new form of industrial infra-structure. One of the primary rationalizations for the
conglomerate is that it minimizes the impact of minor cyclical
economic changes, and in light of our general adoption of Keynesian economic theory, coupled with Welfare and Warfare State
government spending policy, I suspect the conglomerate may be a
well adapted business form to fit this arrangement. Indeed, the
conglomerate phenomenon may be what causes clever-witted
economists to say our economy is moving neither up nor downbut sideways. Since it is not clear that conglomerates are necessarily either anticompetitive or unduly concentrative in nature,
I cannot find reason for criticism in these policies. Indeed, they
seem to be highly competitive and widely dispersed. While I do
not share the Fortune Magazine's overwhelming respect for corporate growth, giantism or groupthink, I am interested in the ingenious responses of American capitalist democracy to the new
realities it encounters and occasionally creates.
But these expressions of sunny optimism do not imply that I
am for a moment content with the present situation. Frankly, I
have grave misgivings about the failure of the securities regulators
to look carefully at conglomerate acquisitions effected by stock
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transactions. I have no doubt that the "high flyer" image of the
publicly traded conglomerate is amply justified by corporate
policies of supposed growth by merger and glamour acquisitions.
Nor would it stretch the truth too much to note that a pattern of
frequent and flambuoyant mergers could be well-calculated to
keep the speculative fever in a given stock and hold its market
price artificially high for a sustained period of time. In a national
securities market encompassing over 20 million individual participants, most of whom are both inexperienced and inclined to
speculate rather than invest, it would seem obvious that someone
should be minding the store besides the customer. Finally, I
believe the securities regulatory community should address itself
to this snowballing merger movement, and ask itself some of the
hard questions! What kind of securities market will evolve when
not twenty but two hundred conglomerates wheel and deal
through endless mergers? How relevant to that market will you
be? By what criteria then will you separate the good guys from
the bad guys?

